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Abstract
The Domain Name System protocol is often abused to perform denial-
of-service attacks. These attacks, called DNS amplification, rely on two
properties of the DNS. Firstly, DNS is vulnerable to source address spoof-
ing because it relies on the asynchronous connectionless UDP protocol.
Secondly, DNS queries are usually small whereas DNS responses may
be much larger than the query. In recent years, the DNS has been ex-
tended to include security features based on public key cryptography.
This extension, called DNSSEC, adds integrity and authenticity to the
DNS and solves a serious vulnerability in the original protocol. A down-
side of DNSSEC is that it may further increase the potential DNS has
for amplification attacks. This disadvantage is often cited by opponents
of DNSSEC as a major reason not to deploy the protocol. Until recently,
however, ground truth about how serious an issue this can be was never
established. This technical report describes the data sets obtained dur-
ing a study [1] we carried out to establish this ground truth. We make
these data sets available as open data under a permissive Creative Com-
mons license. We believe these data sets have a lot of value beyond our
research. They, for example, allow characterisations of EDNS0 implemen-
tations, provide information on IPv6 deployment (presence or absence of
AAAA records) for a large number of domains in separate TLDs, etc.
Keywords: DNS, DNSSEC, DDoS, amplification attack, reflection at-
tack, measurements, denial-of-service, attack, network security
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol is a favourite among attackers to
abuse for denial-of-service attacks. DNS is based on UDP and is thus susceptible
to source address spoofing. This property enables the use of DNS in reflection
attacks, where the attacker forges a request to a DNS server in which he puts
a spoofed source address, the address of the victim. The DNS server will then
send the response to the victim. And because, in general, DNS responses are
larger than DNS queries, the attacker will also achieve what is called amplifi-
cation. This means that an attacker can achieve a large attack volume while
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only investing a small amount of attack traffic. Figure 1 shows this attack
schematically.
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Figure 1: DNS amplification attack
Since a number of years a major overhaul of the DNS is underway, the
introduction of the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). DNSSEC enhances the
security of the DNS by introducing authenticity and integrity into the protocol.
This is achieved by digitally signing DNS data. This means that DNS answers
that use DNSSEC are significantly larger than those that use regular DNS,
potentially making DNSSEC a powerful vector for performing denial-of-service
attacks. Opponents of DNSSEC frequently cite this property of the protocol as
a reason not to deploy the technology. There had, however, never been a large
scale study to assess the severity of this problem.
Because denial-of-service attacks are ever increasing in size and severity and
because some of the largest attacks1 rely on DNS amplification we felt the need
to establish ground truth about the potential that DNSSEC has for abuse in
amplification attacks [1]. What we found is that yes, as expected, DNSSEC does
increase the potential for amplification attacks. However, this was only really
the case for a certain kind of DNS query (so-called ANY queries). Since this
query type is not a regular DNS query, but rather intended for debug purposes,
simple and effective measures can be taken to dampen the attack potential.
If we look at regular DNS queries (such as address, or A, queries, which are
the most frequent DNS query) then the increase in amplification that DNSSEC
introduces is far smaller.
In order to measure the impact of DNSSEC on DNS amplification we per-
formed a large scale measurement of DNSSEC-signed domains in six major
top-level domains (TLDs). Our data sets cover 2.5 Million DNSSEC-signed
domains (approximately 70% of the total number of signed domains) and over
1e.g. the ‘Spamhaus attack’ of 2013, http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-
almost-broke-the-internet
2
2.2 Million regular domains, totaling over 54GB of data. We have decided to
share the data we collected during our measurements as open data. To do this,
we use the SimpleWeb platform2 established by our colleagues[2]. This report
provides an overview of the data we collected and gives detailed information
about the structure of the databases containing our results that are available
for download.
1.1 Intended Audience
This document is intended for researchers focusing on network security and
stability in general and on DNS in particular. Readers are assumed to be familiar
with the workings of the DNS protocol [3] and its extensions EDNS0 [4] and
DNSSEC [5, 6, 7].
2 Data Sets
2.1 Source Data
We obtained data for six major TLDs. The type of data we obtained is specified
in Table 1. As the table shows, we obtained the full DNS zone file for four TLDs
and we obtained partial data for two other TLDs. In the latter case we obtained
a list of all DNSSEC-signed domains and a random selection of non-DNSSEC
domains. The most right-hand column in the table shows the percentage of
domains with DNSSEC compared to the total number of domains in the TLD.
TLD Kind of data Date #domains in TLD #DNSSEC-signed
.com Full zone March 2014 113.1M 326.5k (0.3%)
.net Full zone March 2014 15.2M 69.5k (0.5%)
.org Full zone April 2014 10.3M 37.6k (0.4%)
.nl Selection April 2014 5.4M 1696.1k (31.2%)
.se Full zone March 2014 1.4M 334.9k (24.8%)
.uk Selection April 2014 10.6M 10.2k (0.1%)
total 156.0M 2.5M (1.6%)
Table 1: Overview of source data
2.2 Collected Data
For each TLD we collected two sets of data, for DNSSEC-signed domains and
for non-DNSSEC domains. Data was collected as follows:
1. For each domain we determined the set of authoritative name servers.
2. For each name server we determined the set of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
3. Each IP address of every name server was sent a pre-defined set of queries,
the results of which comprise the data set.
We sent queries using three different modes:
2http://www.simpleweb.org/wiki/Traces
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(a) using ‘classic’ DNS [3];
(b) using EDNS0 [4] with the maximum accepted response size set to 327683;
(c) using EDNS0 with DNSSEC enabled (DO=1) [7], again with the maximum
accepted response size set to 32768.
To each IP address of each authoritative name server we sent a set of queries
using all three modes described above for DNSSEC-signed domains and using
modes (a) and (b) for non-DNSSEC domains. To all authoritative name servers
we sent the following queries:
• ANY query for the domain.
• MX query for the domain.
• NS query for the domain.
• A query for the domain apex and the www and mail names.
• AAAA query for the domain apex and the www and mail names.
• TXT query for the domain apex and the www and mail names.
Additionally, for DNSSEC-signed domains we also sent the following DNSSEC-
specific queries:
• DNSKEY query for the domain.
• a query for a non-existent name to trigger an NSEC3 response.
Prior to performing the queries, we perform a DNSKEY query through a re-
solver to determine whether a domain that is supposed to be signed actually
is and vice versa. Domains that should have been signed and were not were
omitted from the data set, and the same applies to domains that should not
have been signed but were.
Every query is attempted only once and only successful queries were recorded
in the data sets. For each successful query we recorded the following data in
the database:
• the query size (UDP datagram size);
• the response size (UDP datagram size);
• the amplification factor defined as response sizequery size ;
• the EDNS0 maximum response size advertised by the authoritative name
server;
• the value of the truncation (TC) flag;
• the number of answers in the response;
3We chose this value to also register results that exceed the commonly used maximum
response size of 4KB; we decided not to use the maximum value (65535) since we did not
want to risk running into possible boundary conditions in DNS software implementations.
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• the number of authority records in the response;
• the number of additional records in the response;
• the number of distinct resource record types in the response.
Data collection took place over a period of approximately 5 weeks from
March 11th until April 17th 2014. The final data sets, described in Table 2
(DNSSEC) and Table 3 (non-DNSSEC), contain the results of almost half a
billion queries.
TLD #domains #failed #skipped #queried #queries #auth ns
.com 326504 7416 471 318576 54.6 M 2550
.net 69552 2672 55 66814 11.0 M 2476
.org 37621 555 19 37024 6.7 M 2073
.nl 1696103 12304 1002 1682770 233.3 M 1316
.se 334880 8696 100 326067 43.3 M 3681
.uk 10225 314 10 9894 1.6 M 570
total 2474885 31957 1657 2441145 350.5 M n/a
Table 2: Overview of DNSSEC data sets
TLD #domains #failed #skipped #queried #queries #auth ns
.com 498502 55909 2231 436593 37.6 M 27168
.net 99564 13904 355 84882 7.4 M 26396
.org 100000 11031 277 88372 7.5 M 27761
.nl 1000000 69092 6812 921441 69.3 M 31108
.se 499999 37361 149560 311871 21.5 M 23756
.uk 26131 3883 92 21858 1.6 M 7091
total 2224196 191180 159327 1865017 144.9 M n/a
Table 3: Overview of non-DNSSEC data sets
2.3 Database Scheme
2.3.1 General information
TLD DNSSEC database size non-DNSSEC database size
.com com.dnssec.db 5.9GB com.non-dnssec.db 4.2GB
.net net.dnssec.db 1.2GB net.non-dnssec.db 0.8GB
.org org.dnssec.db 0.7GB org.non-dnssec.db 0.8GB
.nl nl.dnssec.db 26.0GB nl.non-dnssec.db 7.6GB
.se se.dnssec.db 4.7GB se.non-dnssec.db 2.5GB
.uk uk.dnssec.dn 0.2GB uk.non-dnssec.db 0.2GB
Table 4: Database files
All databases are listed in Table 4 and are SQLite databases created using
SQLite version 3.7.9. They should be compatible with any SQLite version from
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3.7 and up, but may also work with earlier versions of SQLite 3 as no features
specific to version 3.7 were used. Every database contains two types of tables
described in the next two subsections below. In these descriptions, database
columns that contain data that was anonymised are marked with [A]. The
anonymisation applied is described in the final part of this section.
2.3.2 Domain information
Each database contains the following four tables with domain information:
• DOMAINS – source list of domain names for the TLD used as input for the
measurement.
• DOMAINS_DONE – unused; originally intended to store the list of domains
for which data was actually obtained. This table was abandoned due
to a change in measurement strategy, but the data contained in it can
easily be constructed using the SQL query specified in Listing 1, where
<RESULTS_TABLE> needs to be replaced by one of the query result table
names specified in the next subsection.
• DOMAINS_FAILED – this table lists the domains for which the measurement
software failed to obtain the authoritative name server set and corresponds
to the third column in Table 2 and Table 3.
• DOMAINS_SKIPPED – this table lists the domains that the measurement
software skipped because they contained DNSSEC data whereas the mea-
surement to be performed was for a non-DNSSEC domain or vice versa.
This table corresponds to the fourth column in Table 2 and Table 3.
Each of the four tables listed above has the same schema outlined in Table 5.
Col# Name Type Description
1 id INTEGER Unique identifier for the domain
used in all domain information
and result tables
2 domain [A] VARCHAR(255) The domain name
3 dnssec BOOLEAN Set to 0 if the domain is
non-DNSSEC and set to 1 for
DNSSEC-signed domains
Table 5: Domain information table schema
Listing 1: Querying for domains for which data was obtained
SELECT domain FROM DOMAINS WHERE id IN
(SELECT distinct domain_id FROM <RESULTS_TABLE >);
2.3.3 Query results
For each query type measured (outlined in Section 2.2) there are three ta-
bles: one for plain DNS queries, one for EDNS0 queries and one for EDNS0
with DNSSEC enabled queries. This means that the following result tables are
present in each database:
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• A_RESPONSES_REGULAR
• A_RESPONSES_EDNS0_PLAIN
• A_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
• AAAA_RESPONSES_REGULAR
• AAAA_RESPONSES_EDNS0_PLAIN
• AAAA_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
• MX_RESPONSES_REGULAR
• MX_RESPONSES_EDNS0_PLAIN
• MX_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
• NS_RESPONSES_REGULAR
• NS_RESPONSES_EDNS0_PLAIN
• NS_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
• TXT_RESPONSES_REGULAR
• TXT_RESPONSES_EDNS0_PLAIN
• TXT_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
• ANY_RESPONSES_REGULAR
• ANY_RESPONSES_EDNS0_PLAIN
• ANY_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
• NSEC_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
• DNSKEY_RESPONSES_EDNS0_DNSSEC
Note that for DNSSEC-specific queries we did not measure plain DNS or
EDNS0 without DNSSEC, hence these tables are not present.
Each result table has the same schema outlined in Table 6 on page 10 of this
report.
2.3.4 Anonymisation
As was already mentioned in the introduction to this section, certain values in
the data set have been anonymised. This applies to all domain names in the
data sets as well as all IP addresses of authoritative name servers in the data
set. These values were anonymised for several reasons:
• Anonymisation was a condition of the TLDs from which source data was
obtained for publishing the data sets.
• Anonymisation prevents abuse of the data sets for creating lists of DNSSEC-
signed domains that are especially suited for abuse in amplification at-
tacks.
• The privacy of domain name holders is protected.
• The privacy of DNS operators is protected.
To anonymise the data, the following algorithm was applied:
anon_value = hash(secret -salt | actual_value)
The SHA-256 hash algorithm [8] was used as the hashing function, a fresh
random 512-bit salt generated using a cryptographically secure random number
generator was used for each separate result database. This also prevents users of
the data sets from combining the results from multiple sets to find authoritative
name servers that serve zones in more than one TLD. The salt values were
retained and are stored in a secure location such that we can identify individual
domain names and authoritative name servers in the set upon the request of
fellow researchers. Note that there is no efficient way to reverse anonymisation,
thus we will consider such requests on a case-by-case basis and reserve the right
to deny the request at our discretion.
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2.4 Collection Software
We have decided not to release the software used to collect the data sets into the
public domain for the moment as we intend to use this software for a follow-up
project. If you are interested in using our software for your research, please
contact one of the authors of this report and state your interest in doing so.
The software is written in ANSI C and depends on libldns from NLnet Labs4,
SQLite 3.7 or up and requires POSIX threads. It should run on any modern
Linux, UNIX or BSD system without modification.
3 Conditions of Use
Use of the data sets described in this document and specified explicitly in Table 4
is subject to the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0
International (CC BY-SA 4.0) license that can be found at:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
If you use the data sets for research purposes and want to publish your
results, citing this technical report fulfills the requirements of the license. We
appreciate any feedback on the data sets and would like to hear how you have
used our data for your research.
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Col# Name Type Description
1 domain_id INTEGER Corresponds to the domain ID
(id column) from the domain in-
formation tables
2 auth_ns [A] VARCHAR(255) The IPv4 or IPv6 address of the
authoritative name server from
which this result was obtained
3 qname VARCHAR(255) The query name (only for A, AAAA
and TXT queries), can be empty,
www or mail
4 rcode INTEGER The DNS response code (RCODE)
returned in the response
5 edns0_supported_size INTEGER The EDNS0 supported size re-
ported by the authoritative name
server in the OPT record in
the additional section (EDNS0
queries only)
6 query_size INTEGER The query size on the wire (UDP
datagram size) as reported by
libldns (see also Section 2.4)
7 response_size INTEGER The response size on the wire
(UDP datagram size) as reported
by libldns
8 amplification DOUBLE The amplification factor defined
as response_sizequery_size
9 truncated BOOLEAN Set to true if the response was
truncated (TC flag set), false
otherwise
10 ans_count INTEGER The number of answers in the re-
sponse (see Section 4.1 of [3])
11 aut_count INTEGER The number of answers in the
authority section of the response
(see Section 4.1 of [3])
12 add_count INTEGER The number of answers in the ad-
ditional section of the response
(see Section 4.1 of [3])
13 distinct_rr_types INTEGER The distinct number of different
resource record types in the re-
sponse
Table 6: Result table schema
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